Don't you think we're making it more difficult than it is?
That's the feeling I often get.
In that context, I often think of a statement I once scribbled down somewhere:
One day a disciple came looking for his master and said, 'Master, after fifty years of study I know how to walk on water.'
The master responded, 'Bravo, but can you give it up?'
(I can no longer trace where I got it from.)
To give an example: Wittgenstein's philosophy is inversely proportional in simplicity to the philosophy about Wittgenstein.
Wittgenstein always writes about the same thing.
"What might that be?", you rightly ask.
My aim is: to teach you to pass from a piece of disguised nonsense to something that is patent nonsense.
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 464
(Was ich lehren will, ist: von einem nicht offenkundigen Unsinn zu einem offenkundigen übergehen.
Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen 464)
Compare that with Wittgenstein's earlier work.My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me fi nally recognizes them as senseless.
Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-philosophicus 6.54
(Meine Sätze erläutern dadurch, dass sie der, welcher mich versteht, am Ende als unsinnig erkennt
Wittgenstein, Logisch Philosophische Abhandlung 6.54)
So much for the complex distinction between the earlier Wittgenstein and the later Wittgenstein in the specialized literature.
In the past few days I have been fascinated by "the private language argument".
That is an argument of Wittgenstein that is not really an argument, he himself never used that terminology, in which he asks himself whether "private language" is thinkable ("denkbar")
A human being can
encourage himself, give himself orders, obey, blame and punish himself;
he can ask himself a question and answer it. We could even imagine human
beings who spoke only in monologue; who accompanied their activities by
talking to themselves. —An explorer who watched them and listened to
their talk might succeed in translating their language into ours. (This
would enable him to predict these people's actions correctly, for he also hears them making resolutions and decisions.)
But
could we also imagine a language in which a person could write down or
give vocal expression to his inner experiences—his feelings, moods, and
the rest—for his private use?——Well, can't we do so in our ordinary
language?—But that is not what I mean. The individual words of this
language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking;
to his immediate private sensations.
So another person cannot understand the language. The individual words
of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private
sensations. So another person cannot understand the language.
Wittgenstein, Philosophical investigations, 243
(Ein Mensch kann sich selbst
ermutigen, sich selbst befehlen, gehorchen, tadeln, bestrafen, eine
Frage vorlegen und auf sie antworten. Man könnte sich also auch Menschen
denken, die nur monologisch sprächen. Ihre Tätigkeiten mit
Selbstgesprächen begleiteten. – Einem Forscher, der sie beobachtet und
ihre Reden belauscht, könnte es gelingen, ihre Sprache in die unsre zu
übersetzen. (Er wäre dadurch in den Stand gesetzt, Handlungen dieser
Leute richtig vorherzusagen, denn er hört sie auch Vorsätze und
Entschlüsse fassen.)Wäre aber auch eine Sprache denkbar, in der Einer seine inneren
Erlebnisse – seine Gefühle, Stimmungen, etc. – für den eigenen Gebrauch
aufschreiben, oder aussprechen könnte? – Können wir denn das in unserer
gewöhnlichen Sprache nicht tun? – Aber so meine ich’s nicht. Die Wörter
dieser Sprache sollen sich auf das beziehen, wovon nur der Sprechende
wissen kann; auf seine unmittelbaren, privaten, Empfindungen. Ein
Anderer kann diese Sprache also nicht verstehen.
Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen 243)
Wittgenstein emphasizes that it is not about ordinary language.
"Aber so meine ich’s nicht."
"But that is not what I mean. "
To be clear: it is about a language that is private, it is about a language that another cannot understand.
What should we do with that?
"
Something that most commentators will agree on is that one of Wittgenstein’s main aims is to
show that such a private language is impossible, and that even if it were possible it would be completely
useless. But this is just one strand of the argument. Intertwined with the remarks about private language
is a separate but related discussion about the relationship between public language and private sensations.
In fact, these two interwoven strands are so closely related that one could see them as two sides of
the same coin. But as suggested above, the range of possible interpretations is vast, and before we start
thinking about what it could all mean, we should first take a look at what Wittgenstein actually said."
Richard Floyd,
The Private Language Argument
What did Wittgenstein actually say?The proposition "Sensations are private" is comparable to: "One plays patience by oneself".
Philosophical investigations, 248
(Der Satz »Empfindungen sind privat« ist vergleichbar dem: »Patience spielt man allein.«
Wittgenstein,Philosophische Untersuchungen 248)
That is what Wittgenstein actually said.
It is an invitation to continue thinking along the same lines.
Patience is played alone because it is inherent to the game.
And language is public because communication with someone else is inherent to language.
"Language is public" is a tautology in the same order as "patience is played alone" and "communication with someone else".
"Language is public".
Why else would I write?
Why else would I write a sentence like: what should we do with that?
However, an important caveat must be made to this reasoning.
"Language" is also just a word, and as such the word "language" has no inherent meaning.
"Gift" is an English present and a German poison.
It is therefore essential to find out what the writer understands by "language".
With modern technology this is quite easy, you can use the control-find key.
As soon as you can sift out a "we" in the text you can assume that the author considers "language" as a social event.
Which makes our sentence look like this: "private language is public".
Or, you can also ask yourself to what extent "language" is actually still public if the author himself determines what meaning he assigns to a word.
In that case, "language" can be considered private and you get the following sentence: "private language is private".
The contradiction in "private language is public" is directly proportional to the meaninglessness in "private language is private".And yet.
And yet I enjoy reading those essays on Wittgenstein.
Because the contradiction or the meaninglessness in the work of others is more pleasant to read than in your own work.
And because sometimes you stumble upon a gem.
"The
real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing
philosophy when I want to.—The one that gives philosophy peace, so that
it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself in question."
Philosophical investigations, 133
("Die eigentliche Entdeckung ist die, die mich fähig macht, das
Philosophieren abzubrechen, wann ich will. – Die die Philosophie zur
Ruhe bringt, so daß sie nicht mehr von Fragen gepeitscht wird, die sie selbst in Frage stellen."
Philosophische Untersuchungen, 133)
This proposition was known to me.
Where other philosophers play a game of tennis (a point has to be made), Wittgenstein plays a game of Jokari (the point has been made).
He knows that the ball will always come back in his direction.
You can therefore simply stop at any time, it is no longer necessary.
However, I did not know this one:
"Wittgenstein is reported by Rush Rhees to have
said "In my book I say that I am able to leave off with a
problem in philosophy when I want to. But that’s a lie; I can’t"
Stewart Candlish,
Private Language I wouldn't have missed that statement for the world.
Some people are doomed (or blessed) to play jokari forever.
Sculpture: Jerzy Kedziora, The puppeteer
